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Do We Have Depressions Licked? 
We've had three economic recessions during the past 11 years, but our 
built-in stabilizers and buffers have worked rather well. Though we 
can't be certain, it looks as though another catastrophic de pression 
such as that of the 1930's is unlikely to re-occur in the years ahead. 
by Karl A. Fox 
FARM FAMILIES have a two-fold interest in the nonfarm 
economy. It is the major source 
of demand for farm products and 
also the source of employment for 
many of our farm youth and 
others seeking nonfarm employ-
ment. Thus, farm people have a 
very direct interest in the well-
being and stability of the nonfarm 
economy. For rather than depres-
sions and recessions being "farm 
led and farm fed,'' the evidence 
points to the reverse. 
The Great Depression of the 
1930's bore with it severe conse-
quences for farm and urban fam-
ilies alike. Thus, economic insta-
bility in the nonfarm economy 
affects and is of concern to farm 
families. How does it affect agri-
culture? 
First, we need to correct some 
widely held notions about the ex-
tent of the variations in nonfarm 
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employment and business activity. 
Much of our continuing preoccu-
pation with economic stability 
stems from that one catastrophic 
experience--the depression of the 
1930's. From 1929 to 1932-33, 
the real gross national product 
(the value of all goods and serv-
ices produced) of our economy 
slumped 30 percent. Industrial 
production skidded SO percent, 
and total employment dropped 20 
percent. At the depth of this de-
pression, a fourth of our entire 
labor force was idle. 
'l;'hen, in every year from 1931 
through 1940, unemployment av-
eraged at least 14 percent of the 
labor force. The defense prepara-
tions of 1940-41 ended this "dec-
ade of idleness." And they were 
followed by the super-activity of 
World War II. From 1942 
through 19 S 7, there was not as 
much as 6-percent unemployment 
in any one year. The average dur-
ing 1948-57 was about 4 percent 
- not much more than the mini-
mum rate necessary to permit the 
normal movement of workers from 
one job to another. 
Not Likely Again . . . 
Economists and many business 
leaders and legislators learned 
enough as a result of the great de-
pression that nothing of a similar 
nature or magnitude is likely to 
recur. It was an expensive lesson. 
But out of it came such things as 
recommendations for counter-cy-
clical fiscal policies; the adoption 
of social security legislation which 
acts to some extent as a built-in 
stabilizer against recession; and 
the passage of the Employment 
Act of 1946 which, among other 
things, created a Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers in the executive 
Office of the President and a Joint 
Economic Committee of Congress. 
Because of definite structural 
changes in our economy and in-
creased knowledge and specific 
national stabilization policies, the 
experience of the 1930's seems 
largely irrelevant to the current 
situation. In the past 11 years, 
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we've seen three recessions and 
two complete recoveries. We're 
now in the midst of a third re-
covery. 
Since 1948 . . . 
The three economic recessions 
since 1948 have been concentrated 
in the durable goods manufactur-
ing industries. And our impres-
sions of the severity of these re-
cessions are typically colored by 
the behavior of a few industries, 
such as automobiles and steel. 
In these recessions during 1948-
58, the average drop in employ-
ment from peak to trough in 
durable goods manufacturing in-
dustries was 13.2 percent. In min-
ing, the average decline was 9 
percent. Nondurable manufactur-
ing industries showed an average 
dip of 5.5 percent, while the aver-
age was 5.9 percent in transporta-
tion and public utilities. 
But the decline in wholesale 
and retail trade averaged only 1.6 
percent. And employment in such 
categories as finance, insurance, 
and state, local and federal gov-
ernment actually increased from 
0.1 to 1.9 percent. 
The average decline in total 
nonjarm employment in the three 
recessions was only 4 percent. 
And, if we allow for the relatively 
stable employment of farm oper-
ators, other farm workers, profes-
sional workers and nonfarm busi-
ness operators, the average decline 
in total civilian employment dur-
ing the three recessions was only 
about 3.1 percent. Thus, the se-
verity of the employment drops 
in each of the recent recessions 
was less than a fifth as great as 
in the 1929-32 depression. 
'ilhy Less Severe? 
A recession in nonfarm employ-
ment cuts the incomes of the 
workers then unemployed. Before 
1933, the purchasing power of un-
employed workers would fall al-
most to zero. When they shifted 
from meat and eggs to flour and 
beans under such emergencies, 
the demand for livestock products 
would shrink, and prices received 
by farmers would drop sharply. 
The effects of built-in stabiliz-
ers, such a unemployment com-
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pensation and a progressive in-
come tax structure, have changed 
this picture to a considerable ex-
tent. 
About a tenth of the total de-
mand for United States farm 
products comes from foreign coun-
tries. The rest of the commercial 
demand comes from domestic 
sources. And at least 90 percent 
of this domestic demand gets into 
the farm economy through the 
stream of consumer spending for 
nondurable goods- food, tobacco, 
cotton and woolen clothing, house-
hold textiles, leather shoes and 
certain other products. Less than 
10 percent of the domestic de-
mand for farm products comes 
through such channels as business 
investment and government pur-
chase (for other than price-sup-
port purposes) . 
The table shows how disposable 
personal income and consumer 
spending are protected from the 
effects of declines in the gross na-
tional product by various "buf-
fers" and "built-in stabilizers" 
which might be likened to the 
shock absorbers and springs of a 
car. 
Changes in corporate profits 
and in government income trans-
fer payments (particularly unem-
ployment compensation ) have off-
set more than half of the decline 
in the gross national product in 
each of the three recessions shown. 
As a result, personal income be-
fore taxes- income actually allo-
cated to individuals - declined 
only 5. 5 billion dollars in the 1948 
recession and less than that in the 
1953-54 and 1957-58 recessions. 
The progressive structure of 
personal income tax rates has had 
a further buffering action-equiv-
alent to 20 percent or more of the 
decline in personal income. (The 
drop in personal taxes during 
1953-54 is partly the result of a 
cut in the general level of federal 
income tax rates in each income 
bracket. ) So disposable personal 
income after taxes declined by less 
than 4 billion dollars in two of 
the recent recessions and actually 
increased by 2 billion during the 
1953-54 recession. 
Consumers vary their rate of 
saving under different circum-
stances. And they usually do so 
in such a way as to further in-
sulate the stream of personal 
consumption spending from the 
effects of a decline in disposable 
income. In two of the recent re-
cessions, personal consumption 
spending actually rose a trifle. 
And in the most recent one, it de-
clined by less than 1 percent. 
The most surprising discovery 
is that, during 1948-58, the Amer-
ican corporation acted as the most 
important shock absorber between 
variations in the gross national 
product and differences in the per-
sonal income stream! This buf-
fering role of the corporation 
wasn't assigned to it by Act of 
Congress, nor was it consciously 
Effects of buffers and built-in stabi lizers bet ween gross national product 
and personal consumption spending during three economic recessions, 1948-58. 
Changes from peak to trough 
(billions of dollars) 
1948-49 1953-54 1957-58 
Gross national product at peak. . . . . .. . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . 265.9 368.8 445 .6 
Less gross national product at trough. . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . 2 56.4 358.9 425.8 
Equals: - ----------
Change in gross national prcduct. ............ . ....... . . . ... . .. - 9 .5 -9.9 - 19.8 
Less change in depreciation , indirect business taxesn . .......... . . + 2 .3 - 0.7 - 1.7 
Equals: -----------
Change in national income . . . . . ... .. ....... . ............. .. . . - 11.8 -9.3b -18.1 
Less change in corporate profits, government transfer paymentsC. .. - 6.3 -8.2 - 13.6 
Equals : - ----------
Change in personal income ... . . . ... . ... . . .. . . .... ... .... ... - 5.5 - I.I - 4.5 
Less change in personal taxesd . ......... .. .... . ... .. ..... . .... - 1. 7 -3. l e - 0.8 
Equals : ----- ------
Change in disposable personal income . . ....... • ... ......... ... .. - 3.8 






Change in personal consumption· expenditures ... . ............. . ... + 0.3 
aAJso involves three other minor items. 
hSJight discrepancies due to rounding. 
cAJso includes six other relatively stable items. 
dAJso includes "personal nonta."{ payments," a relatively small item. 
•Decline partly attributable to a reduction in federal income tax rates. 
+3.2b 
Source: Survey of Current Busi11m, July 1958, pp. 13- l S; economic Indicators, Sept. 1958. 
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developed as a public service by 
the corporations. Apparently it 
simply evolved, step by step, out 
of the cost structure of large-scale 
enterprises, the nature of the in-
vestment market and corporate 
attitudes toward the financing of 
new plant and equipment. 
Taxes on corporate net incomes 
average about 50 percent. The 
reduction in corporate tax pay-
ments ranged from 2.6 to 5.9 bil-
lion dollars in the last three reces-
sions. And corporate profits after 
taxes also declined by from 3 
billion to more than 6 billion dol-
lars in each. But corporate divi-
dend payments showed reductions 
of only from 0.2 to 0.4 billion dol-
lars from a basic level that now 
exceeds 12 billion dollars a year. 
To maintain dividends, corpora-
tions have accepted sharp fluctu-
ations in undistributed profits. 
A "Smooth Ride" . . . 
The effect of these various built-
in stabilizers and buffers has been 
to give the American consumer-
and all parts of the economy de-
pendent on personal income ex-
penditures-an incredibly smooth 
ride during the past decade. It's 
doubtful that any economist in 
the late 1930's or early l 940's 
would have hoped for such a high 
level of performance or would 
have accepted the responsibility 
for achieving it. 
It may be, of course, that events 
(some in the international arena) 
have fallen in a time pattern par-
ticularly favorable to domestic 
economic stability. And the road 
ahead may be rougher, at least in 
spots, than the one we've just 
traveled in 1948-58. 
Farm Effects . . . 
Now let's turn to the effects of 
economic instability on farm 
prices and incomes during 1948-
58. Food products make up some-
thing like 80 percent of the total 
domestic use of farm products in 
the United States. And changes 
in disposable personal income is 
the economic factor that gener-
ally brings about changes in the 
demand for food. 
Generally the degree of insta-
bility in the nonfarm economy 
during 1948-58 was small. The 
buffering action of built-in stabi-
lizers and corporate dividend pol-
icies was large. The result has 
been that recessions in consumer 
mcome have been almost negli-
gible. 
The Future 
Somewhat larger fluctuations 
in gross national product are pos-
sible, but much deeper recessions 
are improbable. And the buffers 
and built-in stabilizers would 
greatly mitigate them if they com-
menced-nor have the means now 
available for deliberate interven-
tion been overtaxed. 
It's conceivable that our eco-
nomic defenses have held because 
they haven't been seriously at-
tacked. There have been other 
periods of 8-10 years in which 
only little cycles have occurred, 
to be followed later by big ones. 
But the new features built into 
the economy and national policy 
since the l 930's aren't imaginary 
or illusory! They've worked 
rather well, and, in most cases, 
we understand why they've 
worked. This promises well for 
our ability to meet future chal-
lenges to economic stability. 
Job Opportunities . . . 
The effects of economic insta-
bility on labor mobility, off-farm 
migration and job opportunities 
for farm people are less conclu-
sive. Does any recession, for ex-
ample, imply that no farm people 
can find jobs in the nonfarm econ-
omy? If not, then the problem is 
to discover how much the prob-
ability of young farm people ob-
taining nonfarm jobs within rea-
sonable lengths of time is reduced 
by recessions of particular severi-
ties. 
We've noted that employment 
in government, service industries 
and in finance, insurance and 
real estate actually increased in 
each of the three recent reces-
sions and that declines in total 
civilian employment averaged only 
about 3 percent. Despite an aver-
age decline of 13.2 percent in 
employment in durable goods 
manufacturing industries, there 
appeared to be good prospects for 
employment in other lines. 
Furthermore, wage rates in dur-
able goods industries are high 
relative to those in some of the 
activities that expanded during 
the recessions or that contracted 
only slightly as did wholesale and 
retail trade. And this latter cate-
gory included more workers than 
did durable manufacturing. 
Unemployment compensation 
for workers in durable goods man-
ufacturing is high enough to act 
as a "support price" and to keep 
the workers laid off by car and 
steel manufacturers, for example, 
out of the labor market for sev-
eral weeks or even months until 
their particular industries revive. 
Government unemployment com-
pensation is supplemented in some 
industries by negotiated supple-
mental unemployment benefit 
plans. 
To the extent that surplus labor 
from manufacturing industries is 
"stored" in this fashion, opportu-
nities for farm people to move into 
nonmanufacturing occupations are 
only slightly impaired by a reces-
sion. And nonmanufacturing oc-
cupations account for more than 
two-thirds of total nonfarm em-
ployment. 
In the 1953-54 recession, the 
decline in total nonfarm employ-
ment was 3. 7 percent for the na-
tion as a whole--but ranged from 
7 percent in the heavily industrial-
ized East-North-Central Region 
to only 1.9 percent in the West-
South-Central Region. The 1953-
54 recession, like our other recent 
recessions, was concentrated in 
the durable goods manufacturing 
industries. Thus, 84 percent of 
the variation among the regions 
in the recession decline in employ-
ment was associated with the per-
centage of nonfarm workers em-
ployed in durable goods industries 
at the beginning of the recession. 
Other studies also show consid-
erable variation in unemployment 
conditions during the recession 
among the different metropolitan 
areas or labor markets around the 
nation. And the implication of 
these diverse patterns also is that 
there must be considerable re-
gional and local variation in em-
ployment opportunities for farm 
people as well as others during the 
course of a "national average" re-
cession. 
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